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model of life cycle savings that may be used toinvestigate the potential
impact of a wide range of government policies on nationalsavings and
economic welfare. The model can provide quantitativeanswers to a number
of long—standing questions concerning the government'sinfluence on capital
formation. These include the degree of crowding out ofprivate investment
by debt financed increases in government expenditure, the differential
effect on consumption of temporary versus morepermanent tax cuts, the
announcement effects of future changes in tax and expenditurepolicy, and
the response to structural changes in the taxsystem, including both the
choice of the tax base and the degree ofprogressivity.
The model tracks the values of all economic variablesalong the transi-
tion path from the initial steady state growthpath to the new steady state
growth path. Hence, it can be used to compute the exact welfaregains or
losses for each age cohort associated with tax reformproposals.
Alan J. Anerbach Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Harvard University Yale University
Cambridge, Mass. 02138 New Haven, Conn. 06520
(617) 495—4934 (203) 436—1937NBER CONFERENCEPAPER SERIES
Papers Available from the Conference on






WP 497"Alternative TaxTreatmentsof the Family: Simulation Methodolo,r
and Results," by Daniel Feenberg and Harvey S. Rosen
"Stochastic Problems in the Simulation of Labor Supply,"by Jerry Hausman
"Alternatives to the Current Maximum Tax on EarnedIncome," by Lawrence B. Lindsey
"The Distribution of Gains and Losses fromChanges in the Tax
Treatment of Housing," by MervynKing
WP 682 "SimulatingNonlinear Tax RulesandNonstandard Behavior: An
Applicationto the Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions,"
by Martin Feldstein and Lawrence B. Lindsey
"Issuesin the Taxation of Foreign Source Income," by Daniel Frisch
WP583 "Modeling Alternative Solutions to the Long—Run Social Security
Funding Problem," by Michael Boskin, Marcy Avrin, and Kenneth Cone
"Domestic Tax Policy and the Foreign Sector: TheImportance of
Alternative Foreign Sector Formulations to Results froma General
Equilibrium Tax Analysis Model," by Lawrence Goulder, JohnShoven, and John Whalley
WP 673 "A Reexamination of Tax Distortions in GeneralEquilibrium Models,"
byDonFullertonand Roger Gordon
"A General Equilibrium Model of Taxation withEndogenous Financial
Behavior," by Joel Slemrod
WP 681"Alternative TaxRulesand Personal Savings Incentives: Microecononiic
Dataand Behavioral Simulations," by Martin Feldstein and DanielFeeriberg
"National Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure ofTaxation,"
by Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff
"Tax Reform and Corporate Investment: AMicro—Econometric Simulation
Study," by Michael Salinger and Lawrence Summers
Itis expected that the papers resulting from this conference will bepublished
in a volume edited by Martin Feldstein.
Copies of these conference papers may be obtained by sending $1.50per copy to
Conference Papers, NBER, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138.
Please make checks payable to National Bureau of Economic Research.Advance
payment is required on orders totaling less than $10.00Name
List of Participants








































National Bureau of' Economic Research
Harvard University and NBER
University of Washington
Princeton University







U.S. Department of the 11'reasury
University of Birmingham England
Yale University
Harvard University
National Bureau of Economic Iesearch
University of Houston
The Brookings Institution
Harvard University & the University







Massachusetts Institute of Technology
University of Western Ontario
Harvard UniversityNational Savings, Economic Welfare, and the Structure of Taxation*
Alan J. Auerbach
Harvard University and NBER
and
Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Yale University and NBER
In the course of the last century, the U.S. rate of net national
savings as conventionally defined declined dramatically from over 20% in
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ment expenditure rose from
measured at book value exci
from under 10% to over 90%
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qualitative predictions of
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equilibrium simulation mode
investigate the potential impact of a wide
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model of savings has been questioned at bo
and empirical levels (Kotlikoff and Summers, 1981), the strict (no bequests)
life cycle model provides an important benchmark to consider the range
of savings and welfare responses to government policy in general and
deficit policy in particular.
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The simulation model can provide quantitative answers to a number of
long—standing questions concerning the government's influence on capital
formation. These include the degree of crowding out of private investment by
debt financed increases in government expenditure, the differential effect on
consumption of temporary versus more permanent tax cuts, the announcement
effecis of future changes in tax and expenditure policy, and the response to
structural changes in the tax system, including both the choice of the tax
base and the degree of progressivity. The model tracks the values of all
economic variables along the transition path from the initial steady state
growth path to the new steady state growth path. Hence, the model can be used
to compute the exact welfare gains or losses for each age cohort associated
with tax reform proposals. Finally, the simulation experiments can usefully
instruct the specification of time series consumption regression models that
purport to estimate how government policy alters national savings.
This paper describes the technical structure of the simulation model and
the solution algorithm used to compute perfect foresight life cycle growth
paths. Next, four examples of potential applications of the model are briefly
examined. These include an analysis of the welfare costs of capital income
taxation, the incidence of the progressive income tax, the effect of fiscal
policy on national savings and the savings response of the private sector to
early announcements of future tax policy changes.
Theprincipalfindings from these applications of the model are:
(1) The excess burden associated with the taxation of capital income
provides some limited scope for improving the welfare of all current and
future cohorts when lump sum taxes and transfers are available. However,
given that lump sum taxes and transfers are not available policy tools, "tax—3—
reform" proposals are likely to significantly reduce the welfare of some
cohorts and significantly raise the welfare of others unless annual tax rates
and their associated deficit levels are chosen with extreme care.
(2) The inter—cohort allocationof the tax burden of government
expenditure is a significantly more important determinant of national savings
than is the structure of taxation.
(3) The long—run effect on the capital output ratio of switching from
a progressive to a proportional income tax with no change in the stock of
government debt is roughly 13 percent.
(4) Short—run crowding out of private investment by balanced budget increases
in government expenditure is on the order of 50 cents per dollar, while long—run
crowding Out IS 20 cents per dollar of government expenditure.
(5) Temporary as well as more permanent tax cuts can lead to increases
rather than decreases in national savings in the first few years following
the enactment of the tax cut. This depends both on which taxes are cut and
which taxes are subsequently raised to finance interest payments on the associa-
ted deficit.
(6) Early announcement of future tax policy changes can significantly
affectthe nationalsavings rate in periods prior to implementation of the legislation.
The welfare costs of capital income taxation, the effects of government
deficit policy on capital formation, and the long run incidence of alternative
tax instruments are the focus of a growing body of economic literature.
While understanding of these issues has been greatly enhanced in recent
years, the literature remains seriously deficient with respect to a number
of theoretical and empirical concerns. The next Section of this paper pro-
vides a selected and brief review of this literature and points out those—4—
deficiencies that can be addressed with the model developed here. Section
III develops life cycle optimization conditions for both proportional and
progressive wage, interest income, and consumption tax structures. The
simulation methodology is described in this section as well. Section IV
examines the welfare costs of capital income taxation distinguishing pure
efficiency issues associated with the structure of taxation from the issue
of inter—cohort redistribution. Section V discusses the effect of progressive
taxation on national savings and describes the economic transition from a
progressive income tax to a progressive consumption tax. Section VI inves-
tigates the long and short run savings impact of alternative government
fiscal policies including temporary and more permanent tax cuts, changes in
the level of government expenditure, and early announcements of future changes
in tax policy. Section VII summarizes the paper and suggests areas for
future research.—5—
II. Selected Literature Review
The long run welfare implications of deficit policy and the choice of the tax
base have been the focus of numerous recent articles (Feldstein (1974), Boskin (1978),
Auerbach (1979), Kotlikoff (1979), Summers (1979) and Bradford (1980)). These
analyses have emphasized the welfare of cohorts living in the new steady
state that results from alterations in government policy; little attention
has been paid to the welfare of generations alive during the transition to
the new steady state. This long run focus has obscured the true scope for
pareto efficient tax reform; to the unwary reader it may also convey the
incorrect impression that deficit policy by itself is inefficient, rather
than simply redistributive. As this paper demonstrates, changes in
government tax and expenditure policies may entail significant redistribution
between cohorts alive today and in the indefinite future. The incidence of
these policies can only be understood by examining changes in the welfare of
all cohorts, transition cohorts as well as cohorts living in the distant
future when the economy converges to a new steady State. The pure efficiency
gains from "tax reform" can not be isolated by looking at changes in the
welfare of only a selected group of cohorts, since welfare changes may reflect
redistribution from other cohorts as opposed to the elimination of excess
burdens in the tax system.
Summers' stimulating study represents the sole attempt to
explicitly examine the welfare of transition cohorts. His
simulation analys:is suggested that proportional wage and consumption taxation
can have markedly different long run impacts despite the fact that the
long run structure of these two tax systems are identical. Summers demon-
strated that the requirement that the governmentts budget be balanced at each—6—
point in time implied a quite different inter—cohort distribution of the tax
burden of financing government expenditure under the wage versus the consump-
tion tax. While the long run tax structures are identical under the two tax
systems, the actual long run tax rates are not.
Summers' analysis, while suggestive of many of the findings presented
here, is based on the assumption of myopic rather than rational expectations;
the transition path of myopic life cycle economies with respect to the size
of the capital stock and the level of utility is likely to differ significantly
from the perfect foresight rational expectations paths analyzed here. In
general, myopic expectation paths will exhibit too rapid convergence to the
new steady state since future general equilibrium changes in gross wage rates
and rates of return are not taken into account in today's consumption deci-
sions; these future expected general equilibrium changes tend to dampen
initial behavioral responses to exogenous changes in government policy
parameters.
In addition to explicit steady state modeling, there have been a
number of recent calculations of the efficiency costs of capital income taxa-
tion (Feldstein 1978, Boskin 1978, Green and Sheshinski 1979, and King 1980).
While pointing out a number of the key determinants of the potential ineffi-
ciencies associated with the taxation of capital income, these analyses are
deficient in four respects—7—
(1) the calculations are partial equilibrium, assuming that gross factor
returns are not affected by compensated changes in the structure of taxation;
this may be a convenient expositional device, but gives incorrect estimates
of excess burden.
(2) very simple models of life—cycle behavior are used, in which indi-
viduals live and consume for two periods, working in the first period only.
Once again, this simplification may be useful for some purposes, but is cer-
tainly a poor description of actual life—cycle behavior. One problem is
that the first—period labor supply assumption implies that changes in the
interest rate have no impact on the present value of resources. Summers
(1979) found that the size of the uncompensated elasticity of savings with
respect to the interest rate depends critically on the magnitude of future
labor earnings. The compensated elasticity of consumption is, presumably, also
quite sensitive to the inclusion of future labor earnings.
(3) these "triangle' calculations ignore the fact that any actual transition
from one tax system to another must begin when some individuals are part way
through life. While these calculations make some sense under the assumption
that cohort specific tax schedules could be introduced in switching from one tax
regime to another, they make little sense under the realistic assumption that
cohort specific tax instruments are not available, The scope for pareto
efficient tax reform may be greatly reduced when the set of alternative tax
instruments is restricted to realistic, non—cohort specific tax schedules.—8—
(4) these analyses study transitions between systems of proportional
taxation, while both current and prospective tax systems are in fact progressive.
It is not clear that a switch from a progressive income tax to a progressive
tax on annual consumption would improve efficiency, even if such were the case
for a switch from a proportional income tax to a proportional consumption
tax. If individual consumption profiles rise with age, a progressive consuxnp—
tion tax implies rising marginal rates of tax on future relative to current consumption,
thu3mimickinga tax on capital income. Moreover, if the progressivity of each tax is
chosen according to a desire to maintain a certain degree ofequality in
society, tax rates may be substantially more progressive under an annual
consumption tax than under an income tax.
Each of these deficiencies may have an important effect on the measure-
ment of the potential gains to society in switching from the current tax
system to one that fully exempts capital income from taxation.
Empirical investigations of the effects of government policy on capital
formation have relied primarily on time series regression models. Feldstein's
(1974) and Barro's (1977) analyses of the effects of social security on
savings and Boskin's (1978) estimation of the "interest elasticity of
saving" provide examples of standard time series procedures. Particular
variables over which the government has some control such as the level of
social security benefits or the level of the current net rate of return are
regressed on aggregate consumption. In addition to social security variables
and the net interest rate, the candidates for "exogeneous" variables have—9—
included current disposable income, the stock of private wealth the the
level of the government deficit, and the level of government expenditure.
As tests of the effects of government policy on savings in a life cycle
model these regressions are subject to a number of criticisms.
(1) The theoretical coefficients of the variables included in these
regressions are functions not only of preferences, but also of
current and future values of capital income and consumption tax
rates as well as current and future gross r.ates of return. Hence,
even if government policy remains constant over the period of esti-
mation the coefficients can not be expected to remain stable since
values of the gross rate of return as well as tax rates will vary
over time as the economy proceeds along its general equilibrium
growth path towards a steady state.
(2) Since the coefficients incorporate current and future tax rates as
well as underlying intertemporal consumption preferences, the esti-
mated coefficients can not be used to analyze changes in government
policy that will necessarily alter the time path of future tax
rates and gross rates of return. This is the Lucas critique and
is particularly applicable to Boskin's (1978) study which contem-
plates switching from our income tax regieme to a completely dif-
ferent tax regieme. namely a consumption tax.
(3) Total consumption is the aggregate of consumption of cohorts of
different ages. Since in a life cycle model the marginal propensity
of cohorts to consume out of their total net future resources
differs by age, the coefficients in the aggregate consumption
regression will be unstable if the distribution of future resources
changes over time. This is clearly the case for the private net— 10—
worthvariable in the social security regressions.
(4) The regressions useproxy variablessuch as disposable income
instead of the present value of net humanwealthin the actual
estimation. Since disposable income is correlated with each of
the other variables in the regressions this errors in variables
problem is likely to impart bias in each coefficient of the
regression.
(5) Despite the fact that some variables included in the regression do
not affect aggregate consumption linearly, linearity is forced on
the data. Each of these critiques can be explored with the simula-
tion model developed here. We intend to simu1ate particular policy
alternatives and, thereby, produce "simulated" data. This data
will then be used in regressions following the specifications found
in the literature. The estimated coefficients will provide an indi-
cation of what economic theory actually predicts about these coef—
ficients in a truly controlled experiment. For example, the esti-
mated coefficients on social security wealth obtained from these
regressions might well prove to be negative, while the data was
obtained from a model in which social security dramatically lowers
the capital stock.—11—
III. The Model and Its Solution
We model the evolution over time of an economy composed of government,
household and production sectors. The household sector is, at any given time,
made up of fifty—five overlapping generations of individuals. Each person
lives for fifty—five years, supplying labor inelastically for the first forty—
five of these years and then entering retirement.
2
Members of a given genera-
tion may differ in their endowments of human capital, but are assumed
to be identical in all other respects. To reflect observed wage profiles, the human
capital endowment of each individual grows at a fixed rate, h. The population
as a whole grows at rate n.
As stated above, each household is a self—contained unit, engaging in
life—cycle consumption behavior with no bequests. Because labor is supplied
inelastically, the labor—leisure choice is not considered. We assume the
lifetime utility of each household takes the form:
u(C) =1_(tcY y>0, l
2 (1)
log c
where C is the household's consumption at the end of itsthyear, and p
and 'y are, respectively, taste parameters characterizing its pure rate of time
preference (degree of "impatience") and the inverse of the partial elasticity
of substitution between any two years' consumption. A large value of p indi-
cates that the individual will consume a greater fraction of lifetime resour-
ces in the early years of life and would lead to a lower aggregate rate of
savings. A large value of y indicates a strong desire to smooth consumption— 12
in different periods. In the extreme, when y equals infinity, the household
possesses Leontief indifference curves, and there is no substitution effect
on consumption behavior.
The individual maximizes lifetime utility (1) subject to a budgetcon—
straint, the exact specification of which depends on the particular tax
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where r and w are the gross payments to capital and labor at the end of
year t, is the labor supplied in year t, and is the average tax rate
on income faced by the household in year t.
By constructing a Lagrangean from expressions (1) and (2), and differen-
tiating with respect to each C, we obtain the first order conditions:
(l+p)_tc_Y A[it(l+r(l_T))jO Vt (3)
where A is the Lagrange multiplier of the lifetime budget constraint,
55 l+r (l—T ) S 'S
e=- I (4) s=t+l l-I-r (l—T )
S
and
Tytis the i4al income tax rate in year t. To understand these first—
order conditions, consider first the proportional tax case, where marginal
and average tax rates are the same. In this case,0 1, and (3) dictates
that the marginal utility of consumption in year t should equal the marginal
utility of lifetime resources, A,timesthe implicit price of a dollar of—13—
year t consumption in year one dollars. With progressive taxes, is less than
one and represents a reduction in the implicit price of year t consumption.
This additional term reflects the fact that an increase in consumption in
year t will reduce income from assets in all future years and thus reduce
all future average tax rates.
Combination of condition (3) for successive values of timplies:
l+r(l—T ).
C= ) c1
This"transition equation" indicates how preferences and the tax structure
interact to determine the shape of life cycle consumption patterns. First,
note that as 'rgrows,time preference and tax factors play a smaller role in
determining the ratio of C to Cti; at y=, C C1 regardless of other
parameter values. For finite values of y,therate of consumption growth
increases with an increase in the net interest rate, and decreases with an
increasein the rate of pure time preference.
Itis important to remember that equation (5) determines only the
shape of the consumption growth path, not its level. To obtain the latter,
weapply (5) recursively t.o relate C to C1 for all t,then substitute the
resulting expression for C into the budget constraint (2) to obtain the
following expression for C1 in terms of lifetime resources:
55
C1
=x F (l+r (l-T )}_l(l-T )w (6) t=l s=2
S ys Yttt- 14-
t—1
55 ()t t
wherex tl (1+p) s2(1+rs(1_ys))]'[fl (1+r5(1_T5))]'}'
is the proportion of lifetime resources consumed in the first year.
For a progressive consumption tax, the budget constraint corresponding
to (2) is:
1
[(i+r)]1w ￿ [(1+r)](1+)c (2')
t=1 s2 t=i s=2
C
where is the average tax rate on consumption in year t. The conditions









wherex ={(1+T)Y (1+p) [(i+r)] (i+ )(1+T )}
c ci S Ct Ct t1 s=2
(t is the tax rate on consumption in year t.) A comparison
of (5) and (5'), indicatesthat, in its influence on the consumption path,
a progressive consumption tax with marginal rates increasing over timehas a
similar influence on the shape of the consumption path as a progressive income
tax.if the progressive consumption tax is levied on annual rather than life-
time consumption then is a function of C. From (5') it is clear that
Tt ctl as r p. Hence, the steeper the growth of. consumption in the
aoseuce of taxes the greater will be the relative taxation of future consump—
Lion under an annual progressive consumption tax.—15—
Explicit presentation of the optimizing behavior of households under
other tax systems is omitted since the derivation of these results follows
in a straight—forward manner from those just presented.
The economy's single production sector is characterized by the Cobb—
Douglas production function:
=E((l+g)tL)l (7)
where Y, Kt and L are output, capital and labor at time t, A is a scaling
constant, g is an exogenous productivity growth rate, and c is the capital
share of output, assumed throughout the paper to equal .25. Lt is simply
equal to the sum of labor endowments of all individuals in the work force.
is generated by a recursive equation that dictates that the change in the
capital stock equals private plus public savings. Competitive behavior on
the part of producers insures that the gross factor returns r and w are




The assumption that the return to capital equals its marginal product implies.
that the market value of capital goods always equal their reproduction cost;
i.e.. adjustment of capital to desired levels is instantaneous.
The government in our model needs to finance a stream of consumption
expenditures, labeled C, that grows at the sane rate as population plus
productivity. For simplicity, the impact of governr.lent expenditures on
individual utility is not considered in the analysis. Aside from various
taxes, the government has at its disposal one—period debt which is a perfect— 16—
substitutefor capital in household portfolios. This enables the government
to save (run surplusses) and dissave (run deficits) without investing
directly. If Ag is defined as the value of government's assets (taking a
negative value if there is a national debt), government tax revenue at the




and Tt are the aggregate average tax rates on income and consl.nnp—
tion, respectively, calculated as weighted averages of individual average
tax rates. Given the government's ability to issue and retire debt, its
budget constraint relates the present value of its expenditures to the
present value of its tax receipts plus the value of its initial assets:
—1 t —1
Ag0 + [ii(l+r)] Rt = (l+r)]Gt (10) t0 s0 t0 s0
(Note that G corresponds to a different concept from that reported in the
National Income Accounts, which includes government purchase of capital
goods.)
The solution method used to compute the perfect foresight general equil—
ibriuin path of the economy depends on the type of policy change being examined.
In general, one may distinguish two cases. In the first, the ultimate char-
acteristics of the economy are known, and the final steady state to which the
economy converges after the policy change is enacted may be described without
reference to the economy's transition path. An example of such a policy
change is the replacement of a system of income taxation with a tax on con—
sumption, subject to year by year budget balance. The configuration of taxes—17—
and the government debt jflthefinal steady state is known here. Thus, it
is possible to solve for the final steady state, and then use our knowledge
of the initial and final steady states to solve for the economy's transition
path.
The second class of problems is one where a policy involves specific
actions during the transition, and the final steady state cannot be identi-
fied independently from the actual transition path. For example, under a policy
which specifies a ten year cut in income taxes, compensated for by concurrent
increases in the national debt, with the debt per capita held constant there-
after and a new constant rate of income tax ultimately established, it is
impossible to solve for this new rate without also knowing the level of per
capita debt which is established in the transition. Here, it is necessary
to solve for the final steady state and transition path simultaneously.
The actual solution for the economy's behavior over time always begins
with a characterization of the initial steady state, given initial tax
structure and government debt. We assume that individuals of different gen-
erations alive during this steady state correctly perceive the tax schedule
and factor prices they will face over time, and behave optimally with respect
to these conditions. We utilize a Gauss—Seidel iteration technique to
solve for this equilibrium, starting with an initial guess of the capital—
labor ratio (K/L), deriving from each iteration a new estimate used to
update our guess, and continuing the procedure until a fixed point is
reached. Given the method of deriving new estimates of K/L, such a fixed
point corresponds to a steady—state equilibrium.
The iteration step is slightly different for each type of tax system,
but the following description of how it proceeds for a progressive income— 18—
taxshould be instructive. (In this example, we assume each generation is
composed of one representative individual. In the actual simulations, we
sometimes allow cohorts to have heterogeneous members.) A schematic
representation is provided in Figure 1. In the first stage, a guess is made
of the capital—labor ratio (equivalent to a guess of the capital stock,
since labor supply is fixed). Given the marginal productivity equations (8a)
and (8b), this yields values for the wage w and interest rate r. Combining
these values with initial guesses for the paths of marginal and average tax
rates over the life—cycle, we apply equations (3) and (6) to obtain the life—
cycle consumption plan of the representative individual, C. From the defi-
nition of savings, this yields the age—asset profile, A, which may be
aggregated (subtracting any national debt assumed to exist) to provide a
new value of the capital stock and capital—labor ratio. The age asset
profile, along with the estimates of w and r, also provides a solution for
the age—income profile, which, in turn, dictates the general level at which
taxes must be set (typically one parameter is varied in the tax function)
to satisfy the government budget constraint and hence the new values of
marginal and average tax rates faced over the life—cycle, T and T, res-
pectively. When the initial and final values of K/L and the tax rates are
the same, this implies that the steady state has been reached.
Solution for the final steady state, when this may be done separately
(the first case discussed above) proceeds in a similar manner. In such a
case, the transition is solved for in the following way. We assume the
transition Lo the new steady State takes 150 years, then solve simultan-
eously for equilibrium in each of the 150 years of the transition period















































































































































































































































steadystate will obtain. This solution method is necessary because each
household is assumed to take the path of future prices into account in
determining its behavior. Hence, the equilibrium that results in later
years will affect the equilibrium in earlier years. Specifically, we
assume that individuals born after the transition begins know the transition
path immediately, and that those born before the beginning of the transition
behaved up to the time of the change in government policy as if the old
steady state would continue forever. At the time of the announcement of a
new policy to be instituted either immediately or in the near future, exis-
ting cohorts are "born again"; they behave like members of the new genera-
tion except that their horizon is less than fifty—five years, and they
possess initial assets as a result of prior accumulation. An iteration
technique is used again, but here we must begin with a vector of capital
stocks (one value for each year) and two matrices of tax rates (two vectors
for each year). Further, we cannot simply solve for the behavior of a
representative cohort, but rather must calculate the behavior of each cohort
alive during the transition. This procedure, while conceptually no more
difficult than that used to find the steady states, requires considerably
more computation, As the ultimate paths converge to the final steady state
well before year 150, the assumption about conditions after year 150 does
not influence our results.
when the final steady state may not be calculated independently from the
transition path, thetwostages are combined. Rather than calculate the final
steady state, we simply calculate an 'augmented" transition path lasting
205 years, where the final 55 years are constrained to have the character-
istics of a steady state.— 21—
IV. The Welfare Costs of Capital Incor.ie Taxation
The ultimate impact on the economy of a change in government policy
depends on three key factors. First, the inter—cohort allocation of the total
tax burden of financing government expenditures will determine the level of
tax rates and have important income effects on the consumption of particular
cohorts. Second, the tax structure (choice of tax base) offers the vector
of prices each generation faces, and third, preferences determine each house-
hold's response to a change in incentives. In the case of heterogeneous
population, the intra—generational distribution of the tax burden may also be
an important determinant of the growth path of the economy.
Typically, the impact of tax policy has been studied most closely in
partial equilibrium, static models in which the welfare of a representative
individual is evaluated under alternative tax regimes. As discussed above,
this approach does not permit a study of the inefficiency involved during the
transition from one steady state to another, nor does it tell us about the
intergenerational transfers that may accmpany the transition. For such
issues to be studied, one must use a model in which overlapping generations
exist and the change in tax regime is not considered as an exercise in compara-
tive statics but rather as an explicit policy change that evolves over time.
The classic study of the static type just discussed is that of Feldstein
(1978), who examines the welfare gain from switching to a consumption tax
or a tax on labor income alone from one on labor and interest income. As
Feldstein points out, the choice between taxing labor income or consumption
at a constant rate sufficient to produce an equal present—value revenue yield
has no effect on the path of individual behavior. Thus, if government uses— 22—
debt finance to undo any differences in the timing of tax collections, there
is no difference in national savings, either, since both private andpublic
consumption are identical under the two systems. All that differs is the
distribution of savings between the household and governmentsectors, with
the government saving more under a wage tax because of the earlierreceipt of
tax revenues.
When there is only one generation under study, it is impossible to
imagine a change in individual lifetime tax burden without a concommitant
change in government expenditures. However, once several generations are
considered simultaneously, it is possible to allow tax burdens to be shifted
across generations as the structure of taxation changes. For example, a
switch from wage taxation to consumption taxation which requires notequal
present value yield per generation but rather year by year budget balance
will change the tax burden of each generation in the transition to thenew
long—run steady state, To see why this is so, consider a simple model in
which there is no growth in population or government expenditures and each
individual lives for two periods, working only in the first andconsuming
only in the second. In the long run, if there is no government debt or
deficit, the tax paid on consumption by each individual in his secondyear
must equal the amount which would be paid in the first year under awage
tax. As long as the interest rate is positive, this involves a lower present
value of taxes and, because relative prices are the same under the two
systems, a gain in long—run utility. This result carries through to a more
general model, with individuals living, working and consuming for several
years, as long as wages occur earlier in life, on average, than does consump-
tion. Thus, Summers (1979) found that, holding government revenueper year— 23—
fixed, steady state utility is substantially higher under a consumption tax
than under a wage tax.
But this gain is not due to increased efficiency, since by such a
criterion the two systems are equal (and completely nondistortionary with
fixed labor supply). What is occurring is a transfer from transitional
generations to those in the steady state. In the simple example used above,
all generations would be better off if there were an immediate switch to a
consumption tax, except the first, which would pay its taxes twice and there—
f ore be worse off. As long as the economy is not on a path which is "dynami-
cally inefficient" in the sense that conducting such a chain transfer in
reverse would make all generations better off (as would be true if the growth
rate of annual tax revenues exceeded the interest rate) such steady state
differences do not provide a fair comparison, because implicit in them is an
intergenerational realignment of the tax burden.
One could respond to this problem by requiring that government debt
policy be used to neutralize any such intergenerational transfers, but this
may still fall short of equating the effect of consumption and wage taxation
on all generations. Consider again a simple example with individuals laboring
in their first period and consuming in their second, and suppose the economy
initially faces a wage tax. A complete neutralization of a switch to a con-
sumption tax would require an exemption of the first generation from consumption
taxation (they've already paid the wage tax under the old system) with revenues
in that year being paid for by deficit finance. Thereafter, each period's
consumption tax receipts would redeem the previous period's debt.
However, if, for example, we extended the model to allow individuals to
consume in both periods, this policy would no longer suffice, for exempting— 24—
the older generation from consumption taxes would exempt the younger generation's
first—period consumption as well. Thus, a complete separation of tax structure
from intergenerational transfers would appear to require not only an unconstrained
use of debt policy, but the ability to assess age—specific tax rates as well. In
the absence of such instruments, it may be impossible to go from one tax system to
an "equivalent" one without having real effects on the welfare of individuals in
the transition.
Constraints on the set of tax instruments limit our ability not only to move
between structurally equivalent tax systems without changing the distribution of
cohort welfare, but also to move to a—priori less distortionary tax structures
in a pareto—efficient manner. Indeed, use of the limited set of tax instruments
may, themselves, generate distortions along the transition path. One example here is
transition to a consumption tax, to the extent that annual consumption tax rates
change during the transition. These tax rate changes will introduce distortions in
the intertemporal consumption choice of affected cohorts. In such a case, it would
be possible to improve the welfare of all generations, but it is not obvious what
the appropriate government policy is to accomplish this, given the limitation on
generation—specific tax rates. In this case, requiring that the present value of
taxes be unaffected by the change in tax structure does not provide a guide to
choosing a pareto efficient tax transaction since interest rates will be changing
over the transition and there is no "correct" interest rate to use in the present
value calculations.
We turn now to the results of some simple simulations to demonstrate some of
the points just made.
In the following example, we consider the transition paths of an economy that
starts at an initial steady state with a proportional wage tax of .2 and a pro-
portional interest income tax of .4 and switches to either a pure consumption tax
or a pure wage tax. The government's budget is assumed to be balanced each year,
hence annual revenues are the same in both transitions. Individual utility para-
meters p and y are set at .02 and 1, respectively.— 25—
Population grows at rate n.O1, while individual humancapitalis
assumed to grow at an annual rate of h.007.In addition, we assume a
constant productivity growth rate of g.02. The tax rates on capital and
labor and the parameters n, h and g are chosen to accord with empirically
observed magnitudes, while p and •providereasonable results for the age—
consumption profile and capital—output ratio in the initial steady state.
Nevertheless, the results should be seen as illustrative and specific magni-
tudes viewed with some care.
Some steady—state results of the simulation are summarized in Table 1.
From a capital—ouptut ratio of 2.92 and a savings rate of 10% under the income
tax, the economy goes to a moderately higher value of each under a wage tax
(3.97 and 13.5% respectively) but the shift to a consumption tax goes much
further: the capital—output ratio is more than double under a consumption
tax. It appears from these results that the change in efficiency of a tax
structure may be less important in determining the characteristics of the
ultimate steady state than the coincident intergenerational transfers. To
see the effect of such transfers, consider Figure 2, which presents the
change in welfare for each generation between each of the two new systems and
the status quo in which the income tax is kept in place. The welfare change
is measured by the percentage increase or decrease in the vector of household
consumption chosen under the initial tax system necessary to reach the level
of utility attained under the new tax system. VC represents the gain in
welfare under a consumption tax, and VW the gain under a wage tax. The
horizontal axis indexes the individual generations, with generation one
being born at the beginning of the period in which the changes are enacted.
As is clear from the graph, though steady state welfare is improved under
each tax change, there are losinggenerations along the way. Moreover, the— 26 —
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identityof such generations, as well as the size of the ultimate steady—state
welfare gain, is very different under the two regimes.
For a switch to wage taxation, retired generations, as well as those soon to
retire, gain because the bulk of their remaining income and tax liability under
the income tax would be in the form of interest income and taxes on such income.
Individuals born soon before or soon after the tax change are hurt. To under-
stand why, it helps to consider the path of capital stock growth under the wage
tax, relative to the baseline economy, depicted in Figure 3 as KW.(The corres-
ponding path for the consumption tax is labeled KC.) Note that while the capital
stock is eventually fifty percent larger, this higher level is not reached for
several years. Thus, while the added capital will lead to an increase in real
wages eventually, this rise will not occur immediately. Moreover, as the revenue
lost from removing the interest income tax must be made up by an increase in the
wage tax, net real wages decline substantially in early transition years.
The move to a consumption tax has very different effects. All generations
older than twenty at the time of enactment lose, because they have paid labor
income taxes when young and will now have to pay consumption taxes when old. The
maximum loss of about 2.5 percent of lifetime resources for individuals aged 45
at the time of enactment represents a very large loss during this cohort's
remaining years——consumption taxes are on the order of 40 percent in the earliest
transition years, more than doubling the tax liability for such individuals rela-
tive to the old system. These losses are greater in total than those under a
wage tax, but so are the eventual gains for succeeding generations. The implicit
transfers from tile old allow generations born as soon as five years into the
transition to enjoy a twelve percent increase in real wealth, with an ultimate
steady—state increase of twenty—two percent.
A response to these findings conceroing welfare changes under a consump-
tion tax might be to accept the prospect that some generations will lose and








































































































generations, the social gain must be quite positive. This is the argument
made by Summers (1979). On the other hand, such an approach would also
appear to favor a consumption tax over a wage tax, judging by the welfare
comparison in Figure 2 *soit is questionable what role, if any, is being
played by pure efficiency gains.
Following Phelps and Riley (1978), another way of attacking this problem
is to require that other measures accompany the tax change to insure that no
generation be harmed. Without lump—sum transfers, such a policy probably
requires a combination of deficit policy and the use of wage as well as
consumption taxes. In Figure 4 ,thewelfare path of one such policy, labelled
VPARETO, is presented, along with the paths VC and .TW from Figure 2. Figure
5 presents the corresponding capital growth paths. The policy depicted
involves starting with a wage tax of twenty—three percent and a consumption
tax of nine percent, gradually lowering the wage tax over fifty years to
fifteen percent while raising the consumption tax to eighteen percent, and
running deficits over the same period. The welfare path resembles that of a
wage tax, except that generations older than twenty at the time of enactment
gain less and all other generations do better. The use of deficit policy
and wage taxation causes the capital stock to reach a value well below that
attained under a pure consumption tax.
Although this "Pareto path" is not unique, it demonstrates two important
results. First, even without a full complement of instruments at the disposal
of government, the long run efficiency gains of exempting capital income from
taxation are large enough to allow all generations to benefit. Of equal
importance, the ultimate steady state gain is only about one—third the gain
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two—thirdsof the long—run welfare gain of switching to a consumption tax
to coincident intergenerational transfers, and the remainder to tax efficiency.
As this result is for a model with fixed labor supply, it is if anything an
overstatement of the real efficiency gains to be had under such a change In
tax regime.— 34—
V. Progressive Taxation
The previous section of the paper focused on the transition
from a system of proportional income taxation to alternative
systems of proportional taxation. In reality, the U.S. tax system is pro-
gressive (at least as measured by statutory tax rates) and it is likely that
any new tax system would possess this characteristic as well.
In considering the additional influence of tax progressivity, we alter
our existing model in a number of ways. To facilitate the more complicated
simulations necessary we ignore growth of human capital or productivity.
(These parameters were found to have minor effects on the nature of transi-
tions under proportional taxation). As progressive taxes exist in part to
mitigate the inequality of resource distribution in society, it is important
to allow for the existence of heterogeneous individuals. This is accommodated
in a simple manner, by assuming that each cohort has three representative
individuals, with equal tastes but unequal incomes. Letting the median indi-
vidual have an annual labor endowment of 1.0, the poor household is assumed
to possess an endowment of 0.5, and the wealthy one an endowment of 1.5.
Our final change is in the tax system itself. We replace the different
systems of proportional taxation with two—parameter progressive taxes; that
is, if z is the relevant tax base, we choose two parameters, labelledand
B, and set the marginal tax rate equal to a+Bz for all values of z.It
follows that the corresponding average tax rate is n+Bz. Setting B=O amounts
to proportional taxation. Highly progressive tax systems are represented by
low values of c and high values of B. For the simulations of this section,
the parameters from the basic proportional tax simulations above are maintained— 35_
(y=1,p=.02, n=.O1);and B are set equal to .12 and .14 respectively for
the progressive income tax. These values ofand B were obtained from a
least squares regression of the marginal tax rates contained in the U.S. tax
code, with income normalized to correspond to the levels in our simulations.
Table 2 gives the marginal and average tax rates which result in the
steady state under progressive income taxation. For the poor person, marginal
tax rates rise from .19 to .24, then dropping to .17 upon retirement and to
.13 in the last year of life. The corresponding values for the median and
wealthy households are (.26, .34, .20, .13) and (.33, .43, .22, .13) respec-
tively. This tax structure would be expected to reduce the inequality in
society, but changing marginal rates might cause inefficiencies in excess of
the tax wedges introduced by equal—revenue proportional taxes. These two pro-
positions are verified by examining the results of a switch from progressive
to proportional income taxation. The poor in the long run have their real
wealth (as measured above) reduced by 3.00%; the rich gain in wealth by 6.37%,
and the median group is virtually unaffected (their wealth loss is 0.45%).
This may very well represent a large loss in social welfare, taking distribu-
tion into account. However, it is clearly a gain in efficiency, since the
proportional wealth gain of the rich is calculated on a much larger base than
the proportional loss of the poor. This is corroborated by the fact that
the long—run capital stock under progressive income taxation is 11% lower
than under proportional income taxation.
Turning next to consider a switch from progressive income to progressive
consumption taxes, we may ask two additional questions. First, how progres-
sive does the consumption tax have to be to maintain the same degree of
wealth inequality, measured by the Lorenz curve, as exists under a progressive— 36—
Table2
Simulated Tax Rates Under Progressive Income Taxation
Poor Median Wealthy
Age MTR ATR MTR ATR MTR ATR
1 0,190 0.133 0.260 0.190 0.330 0.225
2 0,191 0.156 0.262 0.191 0.333 0.226
3 0.193 0.156 0.264 0.192 0.333 0.228
4 0.194 0.132 0.267 0.193 0.338 0.229
5 0.195 0.158 0.269 0,194 0.341 0.230
6 0.196 0,138 0.271 0.195 0.344 0.232
7 0.198 0.159 0.273 0.197 0.346 0.233
0 0.199 0.160 0.273 0.1Si 0.349 0.234
9 0.200 0.160 0.277 0.199 0.332 0.236
10 0.202 0.161 0.280 0.200 0.334 0.237
11 0.203 0,162 0.282 0.201 0.332 0.238
12 0.204 0.162 0.234 0.202 0.360 0.240
13 0.206 0.163 0.286 0.203 0.362 0.241
14 0.207 0.164 0.288 0.204 0.365 0.242
15 0.208 0.164 0.291 0.205 0.367 0,244
16 0.210 0.165 0.293 0.206 0.370 0.?45
17 0.211 0.166 0,295 0.207 0.372 0.246
18 0.212 0.166 0.297 0.208 0.373 0.247
19 0.214 0.167 0.299 0.209 0.377 0.249
20 0.215 0.168 0.301 0.211 0.380 0.250
21 0.216 0.168 0,303 0.212 0.382 0.251
22 0.218 0.169 0.305 0,213 0.385 0.252
23 0.219 0.169 0.307 0.214 0.387 0.254
24 0.220 0.170 0.309 0.213 0.339 0.255
25 0.271 0.171 0.311 0.215 0.392 0.256
26 0.223 0.171 0.313 0.216 0.394 0,257
27 0.224 0.172 0.315 0.217 0.394 0.258
28 0.225 0.122 0.317 0.218 0.398 0.259
29 0.226 0.1/3 0.318 0.219 0.401 0.260
30 0.227 0.174 0.320 0,220 0.403 0.261
31 0.228 0.174 0.322 0.221 0.403 0.262
32 0.229 0.173 0.323 0.222 0.407 0.263
33 0.230 0.175 0.325 0.222 0.409 0.264
34 0.231 0.173 0,326 0.223 0.411 0.265
35 0.232 0.116 0.328 0.224 0.412 0.266
36 0.233 0.176 0.329 0,225 0.414 0.267
37 0.233 0.127 0.330 0.225 0.414 0.263
38. 0.234 0.177 0.332 0.226 0.413 0.269
39 0.235 0.177 0.333 0,226 0.419 0.270
40 0.235 0.178 0.334 0.227 0.421 0.270
41 0.236 0.178 0.335 0.221 0.422 0.271
42 0,236 0.178 0.335 0.228 0.424 0.272
43 0.236 0.178 0,336 0.228 0.425 0.272
44 0.237 0.178 0,331 0.228 0.424 0,273
45 0.23/ 0.178 0.337 0.229 0.421 0.274
46 0.167 0.143 0.198 0.159 0.219 0.170
47 0.164 0.142 0.193 0.156 0.212 0.166
48 0.160 0.140 0.18/ 0.133 0.205 0.162
49 0.156 0.138 0.181 0.150 0.19/ 0.158
50 0.152 0.136 0.1/4 0.141 0.188 0.154
51 0.148 0.134 0.166 0.143 0.119 0.149
52 0.113 0.132 0.158 0.139 0,16U 0.144
53 0.138 0,129 0,150 0.133 0.131 0.139
54 0.132 0,126 0.140 0.130 0.146 0.133
55 fl,1'A ñ irni ,'.,.— 37—
income tax. Second, how is the change in steady—state utility and capital
intensity between the two systems affected by the introduction of progressivity.
In answer to our first question, we find that the values of a andwhich
must be applied under a consumption tax to provide an identical Lorenz curve in the
lon run to that of the income tax are .104and .432,re3ective1y. These translate
into the marginal and average tax rates listed in Table 3. Asconsumption
profiles rise over time, so do the tax rates of all three groups. The
marginal tax rates applied to the poor person's consumption range between .30
and .34. As these rates are fractions of consumption, it is helpful incom-
paring them to income tax rates to translate them into fractions of resources
used for consumption (consumption plus taxes paid on such consumption). The
corresponding values are .23 and .25, respectively. For median income house-
holds, the range is .48 to .54 (.32 to .35, gross); for wealthy individuals,
the range is .63 to .71 (.39 to .42, gross). Interestingly,the top (gross)
marginal tax rates for the three groups are almost identical to the top rates
for each under an income tax (.25, .35 and .42 versus .24, .34 and .43).
In comparison to the change in capital stock under proportionaltaxes, a
switch to consumption taxes under progressive taxation leads to a lowercapital
stock increase, with the capital stock going up by a factor of 3.06 in the
current simulation relative to the 3.32 found above under proportional taxes.
Similarly, the welfare gain is smaller. Each group in the steady state
obtains a 16% increase in real wealth, relative to the 22% gain underpropor-
tional taxes. These differences result because as emphasized above under
progressive consumption taxes there remains an intertemporal distortion in
the choice of consumption. With consumption rising over time, each household's
net rate of return is less than the gross interest rate. Our resultssuggest— 38—
Table3
Simulated Tax Rates Under Progressive Consumption Taxation
Poor Median Wealthy
1 0.302 0.203 0.475 0.289 0,629 0.366
2 0.303 0.203 0.476 0.290 0.630 0.367
3 0.303 0.204 0.4/1 0.290 0.632 0.368
4 0.304 0.104 0.4/U 0.291 0.633 0.36?
5 0.305 0.204 0.479 0.292 0.635 0.369
6 0.305 0.205 0.480 0.292 0.636 0.370
7 0.306 0.205 0.401 0.293 0.638 0.371
8 0.307 0.205 0.48? 0.293 0.639 0.372
9 0.307 0.206 0.483 0.294 0.641 0.372
10 0.308 0.206 0.481 0.294 0.642 0.373
11 0.309 0,206 0.486 0.295 0,644 0.374
12 0.309 0.207 0.487 0.295 0.645 0.375
13 0.310 0.207 0.488 0.296 0.64/ 0.375
14 0.311 0.207 0.489 0.297 0.648 0.376
15 0.311 0.208 0.490 0.29? 0.650 0.377
16 0.312 0.208 0.491 0.298 0.651 0.378
17 0.313 0.208 0.492 0.298 0.653 0.376
18 0.313 0.709 0.493 0.299 0.654 0.379
19 0.314 0.209 0.495 0.299 0.656 0.380
20 0.315 0,209 0.496 0.300 0.63/ 0.381
21 0.315 0.210 0.491 0.301 0.659 0.381
22 0+316 0.210 0.498 0.301 0.660 0.382
23 0.317 0.210 0.499 0.302 0.662 0.383
24 0.317 0.711 0.500 0.302 0.663 0.384
25 0.318 0.211 0.502 0,303 0.665 0.385
26 0,319 0.211 0,503 0.303 0.66) 0.385
2? 0.319 0.212 0,504 0.304 0.660 0.386
28 0.320 0.212 0.505 0.305 0.670 0.387
29 0.321 0.212 0.506 0.305 0.6/1 0.388
30 0.321 0.213 0.50/ 0.306 0.6/3 0.388
31 0.322 0.213 0,509 0.306 0.674 0.389
32 0.323 0:213 0.510 0.307 0.676 0.390
33 0.323 0,214 0.511 0.307 0.6)7 0.391
34 0.324 0.214 0.512 0.300 0.6)9 0.392
35 0.325 0.214 0.513 0.309 0.681 0.392
36 0.326 0.215 0.514 0.309 0.68! 0.393
37 0.326 0.215 0.516 0.310 0.684 0.394
38 0.327 0.216 0.51? 0.310 0.665 0.395
39 0.328 0.216 0.516 0.311 0.68/ 0.396
40 0.318 0.216 0.519 0.312 0.689 0.396
41 0.329 0.717 0.520 0,312 0.690 0.397
42 0.330 0,217 0.522 0.313 0.692 0.398
43 0.330 0.21/ 0,523 0.313 0.693 0.397
44 0.331 0.218 0.524 0.314 0.695 0.400
45 0.332 0.218 0.525 0.315 0,697 0.400
46 0.333 0.218 0.527 0.315 0.698 0,401
47 0.333 0.219 0.528 0.316 0.700 0.402
48 0,334 0.219 0.529 0.31? 0,70) 0.403
49 0.335 0.219 0.530 0.317 0.703 0.404
50 0.335 0.220 0.531 0.310 0.705 0.404
51 0,336 0.220 0.533 0,318 0./06 0.405
52 0.337 0.221 0.534 0.319 0.708 0.406
53 0.338 0.221 0.535 0.320 0.710 0.407
54 0.338 0.221 0.536 0.320 0.711 0.408
¶35 0.339 0.222 0.538 0.321 0.71% 0.409— 39—
thatefficiency gains of a switch may still be possible, even with the
requirement that no generation be harmed, but the scope for such gains is
clearly reduced by the need for tax progressivity to address the important
problem of societal inequality.— 40—
VI.The Effects of Tax Cuts, Government Expenditure, and Policy Announcements
on Capital Formation.
In this section, we consider the general equilibrium effects of selected
fiscal policies, and also examine how a switch from income taxation to the
taxation of either consumption or wages would be affected by a prior
announcement of such a policy.
By assumption, the government is rational and recognizes that its tax
rate and expenditure paths will affect the economy's path of labor earnings,
interest income, and consumption. Hence, changes in announced tax rates and
expenditure levels must satisfy the government budget constraint (9) consis-
tent with the general equilibrium changes in income and consumption such
government policy choices induce.
This suggests the following important points about government policy:
Temporaryor permanent increases in government expenditures
necessitate changes inthe path of taxrates. The choice of which tax
rates to increase and when to increase those tax rates will determine
the short run and long run impact of increases in government expenditure
on national savings.- 41-
Temporarycuts in tax rates holding expenditures constant must be
4
made up by increases in tax rates in the future.Again the timing and
choice of future tax rate increases will influence the economic reaction
to temporary tax cuts.
Balanced budget changes in the choice of tax bases will require
annual adjustments in tax rates until the economy converges to a new
steady state. These annual tax changes during the transition are likely
to be both inefficient in the sense of generating excess burdens and
capricious in their cohort allocation of the tax burden of financing
government expenditure.
Announcement today of future changes in tax rates can have important
implications for current revenue since the current stream of income and
consumption may be affected by future tax rate policy.
A. TemporaryTax Cuts
Table4 presents the effect of cuts in tax rates lasting 5, 10, and















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































andcapital output ratio. Two types of tax cuts are considered, a re-
duction in the proportional rate of income taxation and a reduction in
the taxrateon wage income alone, holding the tax rate on capital in-
come constant. As mentioned, temporary tax rate cuts require future tax
rateincreases. The simulations presented are based on the assumption
that followingthe period of tax rate cuts the per capita debt resulting
from these tax cuts is parmitted from that point on to grow at the
economy's 2 percent rate of productivity growth. The base case with
which to compare these results assumes p.02 and y1, and a 30
percent proportional rate of income taxation with no initial government
debt. For cuts in the proportional income tax, tax rates are reduced to
25 percent for the period in question. In the case of wage tax reductions,
this tax rate is lowered to 23.33 percent for either 5, 10, or 20 years; a
2.3.33 percent wage tax rate provides the same first year tax
revenue reduction that is generated by cutting both wage and capital in-
come tax rates to 25 percent.
Although taxes are cut initially by over 15 percent, Table 4 indicates
fairly small responses of aggregate consumption to tax cuts of short
duration. A five year cut in the wage tax rate leads to only a .5 percent
increase in consumption in the first year of the cut. The reason is
simply that the majority of cohorts will end up paying for these current
taxcuts in terms of higher tax rates and lower future wages after the
5yearperiod. The deficit created by this short term tax reduction has
a limited wealth effect on the economy.
Taxcutsof longer duration have more significant effects on national
savings.A 20year wage tax cut increases aggregate consumption in the— 44—
firstyear of the transition by 1.73 percent and lowers the national
savings rate in year 2 from 9.40 percent to 8.34 percent. There is a
13 percent long run reduction in the capital output ratio from 3.11 to
2.62; the gross wage rate falls by 5.56 percent In the long run, while the wage
tax rate levied on this lower tax base must rise to 39 percent to finance
interest payments on the debt as wellas future government expenditures.
The net wage falls, therefore, by b percent relative to its value in
the no tax cut case.
For each of the wage tax Cut simulations the long run crowding out
of private capital by one dollar of government debt is approximately 52
cents.The long run ratios of debt to capital are respectively .07, .17,
and ..0forwage tax cuts of .,10,and 20 years. The 52 cent figure
reflects two facts. First, holding gross factor returns fixed, switching
government tax receipts from the present to the future leads to a re-
duction in government savings, but anincrease in private savings to
pay for the higher future taxes. Secondly, the reduction In the long
run capital stock lowers gross wages and raises gross and net interest rates,
both of these factors induce greater savings.
Deficits resulting from capital as well as wage tax cuts can generate
a quite different impact on capital formation in the initial phase of the
tax cut. Rather than increase consumption, Income tax cuts can lead to
more national savings in the short run. In the 20 year income tax cut
example, the first year national savings rate rises from 9.40 percent to
9.52 percent although the long run savings rate falls from 9.40 to 7.28
percent. Apparently the temporarily higher net rate of return induces
a sufficiently strong savings response that the government deficit— 45—
actually"crowds in" private capital. The incentives to savings are,
however, only temporary. As the end of the period of tax cuts approaches,
the impending higher tax rates on capital income reduce savings incentives
and the income effects of the tax cut take hold. In the long run there
is a smaller capital stock for deficits arising from changes in the pro-
portional income tax rate; the long run higher tax rate on capital income
generates a permanent savings disencentive. The long run degree of
crowding out is approximately 70 cents on a dollar for each of these
three cases.
B. Government Expenditure and Capital Formation
Increases in government expenditures affect capital formation directly
by raising the government's contribution to total national consumption
and indirectly, by altering the expected path of future tax rates.
Table 5 describes the effect on capital formation of a 5 percent per-
manent increase in expenditures under a number of different financing
scenarios. The first scenario is that the government balances its bud-
get on an annual basis, and, therefore, immediately raises tax rates to
accomodate the increased level of expenditures. Alternatively, the
government is assumed to keep tax rates constant for 5, 10, or 20 years;
i.e.,use deficit financing for these lengths of time At the end of the
constant tax rate interval, the government is assumed to maintain the
current level of per capita debt adjusted for growth. In each case the
tax rate that is adjusted is the proportional income tax rate.
Table 5 indicates that short run crowding out of private investment
is roughly fifty cents per dollar of government expenditure. Under the— 46 —
Table5
Balanced Budget andDeficitFinanced Five Percent
Permanent Increases in Government Expenditure —
TheCrowding Out of National Investment by
Permanent Increases in Government Expenditures
Financing I/G2 AI/G50 1I/tG150
Balanced
Budget












—.504 —.690 —.939 —.800— 47—
balancedbudget regime, crowding out is 52 cents in the first year of
the transition; it is 53 cents under the assumption of constant tax
rates for 5 years, but it is only 50 cents for the case of constant
tax rates for 20 years. In the latter case, the extended period
during which capital income Is taxed at a lower rate promotes savings
and "crowds in" an additional 2 cenEs of investment in the first year
of the transition.
Short run crowding out exceeds long run crowding out in the balanced
budget example for two reasons.First, even in partial equilibrium
permanently increasing the rate of proportional income taxation will alter
the economy's path of wealth accumulation; existing cohorts at the time
of the tax increase hold assets that were accumulated based on the
previously low capital income tax rate. The initial set of elderly in
particular find that at the lower net interest rate their assets are large
relative to their new desired levels of future consumption. They proceed to
rapidly adjust their consumption levels upward. In the long run this
consumption of "excess assets" does not occur; all long run cohorts hold
assets that were accumulated from birth based on the lower net return
to capital. The second reason is that crowding out leads to lower long
run capital labor ratios and, in general equilibrium, higher gross and net
rates of return. These higher long run gross interest rates dampen
the savings response to the higher tax rates.Although tax rates
increase In the transition from .315 in the first year to .318 in year
150, the net interest rate starts out at .055 and rises to .056 be-
cause the gross interest rate increases from .0&) to .082.— 48 —
Inthe exampleof a 20year1 deficit financed permanent increase in
government expenditure, long run crowding out is 80 cents which exceeds
short run crowding out by 30 cents. The failure to make early elderly
transition cohorts pay for any of the higher level of government expendi-
ture leaves the economy with a lower long run capital stock. Although
year its consumption is lower in the 20 year deficit case than in the
balanced budget example, consumption in the 20 year deficit economy is
higher in succeeding years than In the balanced budget case, and this
lowers long run capital intensity.C. Early Announcement of Future Policy, Effects on National Savig
Early announcement of future policy changes can significantly alter
economic behavior in periods prior to the actual implementation of the
new policy. Given the time required to formulate and enact new tax
legislation, announcement effects are a serious issue of concern. In-
deed, the simulation results suggest that the very process of formulat-
ing tax incentives to stimulate national savings can, itself, dramatic-
ally reduce national savings in the short run depending on the particular
type of tax incentives proposed.
today relative to tomorrow producing a consumption frenzy in the short
term.
Announcements of future wage taxation have the opposite effect on
short term savings rate. Here the poniise of lower rates of capital
income taxation in the near future reduces the relative price of
future consumption and immediately stimulates savings. both diagrams indicate
that economic behavior changes less in the short term the further in the
— 49—
Figures 6 and 7 depict
a complete switch to either
immediately, in five years,
national savings rate jumps
consumption tax is immediate
actually becomes negative in
tax switch will occur In the
tax rates on future consumpt
the effect of announcements in year zero of
consumption or wage taxation starting either
intenyears, or in twenty years. While the
fromten percent to over 40 percent if the
ly enacted, the short run savings rate
response to information that the consumption
near future. Obviously the anticipated high
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futureis the date of policy implementation. Yet policy changes that
will not occur for ten years can still change savings rates in year
zero by over 25 percent.
Figures 8 and 9graph the utility paths associated with these
announced changes in the future tax structure. Nore distant implenta—
tion of the consumption tax relieves initial elderly cohorts of the
heavy taxation of their retirement consumption. Initial youngcohorts
are, in constrast, hit hard by a delay in theswitch to a consumption
tax. Early announcement reduces somewhat the loss in utilityof that
cohort unfortunate enough to retire immediately prior to the tax switch.
The reason is that the induced consumption frenzy lowers the capital
stock and raises the rate of return these retirees receive on their
savings,providing a small offset to the additionalsubstantial tax
burden these cohorts are forced to shoulder.
A similar situation arises in the wage tax case. Here immediate
implementation significantly lowers the utility of Initial young cohorts
because these cohorts face higher wage tax rates during their working
years and lover gross interest rates duringtheir retirement. Delaying
the wage tax implementation causes capital accumulation to increase
immediately providing a higher gross wage forinitial young cohorts who
now face a shorter period of high wage taxrates. The short run increases
In capital lowers somewhat the utility of initial elderlycohorts by
lowering -the gross and, therefore, net return available on their savings.
For announcements of wage tax adoption 10 and 20 years in the future,
only intital cohorts of elderly are adverselyaffected. The induced
short run capital accumulation raises the gross wage enough to compensateworkers














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VII.Summary andSuggestionsfor Future Research
This paper has developed an equilibrium simulation model that can
evaluate the effects of a variety of government policies on national savings and
the inter— and intra—cohort distribution of welfare. The simulations
described in the paper indicate that the long run welfare gains of alleged
"tax reform" policies arise to a considerable degree as a result of redis-
tribution from earlier cohorts. Pareto—efficient tax reform policies do
exist, but involve careful use of our limited set of tax instruments. The
current impact of current tax and expenditure policy depends critically on
the nature and timing of associated future tax rate changes. A corollary of
this is that questions such as "what is the effect of a government deficit
on current savings?" or "what is the effect on savings of capital income
taxation?" are sorely underidentified. Informed discussion of policy alter-
natives requires a full description of the entire future paths of policy
choice variables.
The simulation model can be modified in a number of different ways to
conform more closely with economic reality and to investigate additional
savings policy questions. First, preferences can be extended to include
utility from the actual level of bequests rather than the utility of
descendents per Se.Thisfeature will limit the wealth effects of deficit
policies, but permit more realistic modeling of the U.S. economy (see
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981)). Second, the model can be altered to allow
for costs of quickly adjusting the capital stock. Summers (1980) and
Lipton and Sachs (1980) have analyzed such "q" models in altruistic inter—
temporal settings, but the transition effects of adding investment adjustment
costs in selfish life cycle models may be quite different because of the— 56—
realeffects on savings of inter—cohort wealth transfers (Feldstein (1977)).
In addition to distinguishing new capital goods from capital goods in place,
the introduction of other assets into the economy including land, money, and
housing will improve the predictive capacity of the model and permit an
analysis of the effect of inflation on the allocation of the capital stock
between housing and industrial capital goods.— 57—
Notes
LChamley (1980a, l980b) provides a careful and extensive discussion of
the welfare implications of the tax structure and public debt in an inter—
temporal model of altruistic behavior.
is intended to model a typical household that "appears" at age
twenty, retires at sixty—five, and dies at seventy—five.
3The term correctsforthe present value change in taxes assessed on
the stream of income arising from a change in average tax rates in a one
period setting; letting tstandfor taxes and y for income, yA(T/y) =(AT/Ay—T/y)ty.
4mis rules out the possibility that tax rates are so high initially
that lowering them increases tax receipts.—58--
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